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Administrative Appeal and Judicial Review
of Property Tax Assessments in
California-The New Look
By Kenneth A. Ehrman*
I. Introduction
WILE the clamor in the arena of substantive property tax re-
form has seized the state's attention, a quiet but momentous advance
in procedure has created a new tax equity. This article deals with the
unheralded reform that, in the past four years, has given property tax
practice in California a new look.
These drastic changes have been important for several reasons.
One is that the property tax is still the backbone of California's local
revenues. True, it is a whipping boy. Tax reform is a political banner
that catches the wind between legislative sessions, but waves rather
weakly by the time the lawmakers go home. Despite its critics, the
property tax is hard to replace. It raises more money than any other
state or local tax. In fiscal year 1968-1969, it provided nearly all local
government tax support and about 42 percent of all local and state
revenues collected in California.1
Additionally, the procedural reform has been important from the
viewpoint of the health of the body politic and the lawyer's ability to
help his client. As to the former, in any society that depends on the
consent of the governed, inequity in the tax system-or the feeling of
inequity-is a fruitful target for enemies of that society. Lord Her-
schell, the Nineteenth Century English Lord Chancellor, observed,
"Important as it is that people should get justice, . . . it is even more
important that they be made to feel and see that they are getting it."
2
* B.S., 1938, Harvard University; LL.B., 1960, La Salle Extension University;
Coauthor, TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY; Member, California Bar, ABA Section of
Taxation, and National Tax Association.
1. [1968-1969] CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUALMIATON ANN. REP. 7.
2. Jones, The Trial Tudge-Role Analysis and Profile, in THE COURTS, THE
PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 125 (The American Assembly 1965).
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Resentment against the property tax may be based on substantive mat-
ters, as where a taxpayer who owns a $20,000 home with a $15,000
mortgage realizes that he is paying the same tax as his neighbor whose
$20,000 home is free and clear. But deficiencies in his procedural
remedies are even more apparent.
The significance of the recent procedural revolution for the lawyer
is that now, for the first time in the state's history, a California tax-
payer's representative can invoke laws that guarantee him access to and
the time to gather the information he needs to prepare a case, prescribe
a specified standard for assessment, provide a means to more expertise
on the part of reviewing authorities, and expand the scope of judicial
review. In short, the lawyer is no longer denied effective tools with
which he can work.
The recurring cycle in California's property tax history has been
one of constitutional and legislative changes aimed at equality and uni-
formity, followed by a gradual drift away from these principles and, at
fairly regular intervals, sufficient discontent among the taxpayers to
spark new constitutional and legislative reforms.3 California's property
tax reform began in 1850 when, just one year after the tax itself came
into being in the state's first constitution,4 the first legislature instituted
an equalization procedure. 5 At the same time, the lawmakers violated
the state constitutional principle of equality and uniformity6 by granting
exemptions to certain kinds of property, such as jails, schools, churches,
and the personal property of widows and orphans up to $1,000.T In
an attempt to remedy the system's defects, which were primarily at-
tributable to the tendency of locally elected officials to drift away from
the equal and uniform principle, the State Board of Equalization was
created in 1870.8 The Board received its present form, with essen-
3. See generally K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, TAXiNG CALIFORNIA PROPERTY 13-33
(1967) [hereinafter cited as EHRMAN & FLAVIN]. For a more detailed history of the
California tax system see Gould, The California Tax System, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-3350, at 1 (West 1970).
4. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 13 (1849).
5. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 53, at 135. Equalization in the property tax sense may
refer either to the process of treating each taxpayer's property the same as every other
taxpayer's property or to the equating of average assessment ratios for large blocks of
property, as between classes of property or geographical areas. See generally Report
of the Committee on State Equalization of Local Property Tax Assessments, in
PROCEEDINGS OF FIFTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE-NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 316-
25 (1958).
6. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 13 (1849).
7. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 52, § 5, at 135.
8. Cal. Stat. 1870, ch. 489, at 714.
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tially its present powers, from the California Constitution of 1879.'
In 1911 the legislature, implementing a constitutional amend-
ment of the year before,10 reserved property tax revenues exclusively
for local governmental needs and shifted the burden of state govern-
ment to other taxes." This "separation of sources" was the greatest
substantive property tax reform in the state's history. Another com-
prehensive change was the 1933 shift of some property tax load through
the creation of a sales tax' 2 and, soon thereafter, the adoption of a
personal income tax.' 3
Despite these and other substantive changes over the years, the
legislature never attacked the chaotic state of property tax administra-
tion and procedure. It was not that no one was aware of the defi-
ciencies nor that they went uncriticized. In recent years, a series of
articles by W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., and Francis H. O'Neill' 4 and two
articles by Francis J. Carr' 5 questioned existing procedures and recom-
mended specific reforms.
California was not unique. A national authority stated in 1966
that "the quality of administration of the property tax is universally
worse than the quality of administration we have come to expect in
connection with income and sales taxes."' 6  But taxpayers and their
attorneys felt themselves helpless in their attempts to pierce the asses-
sor's veil of secrecy, arbitrary review procedures, and judicial tolerance
of shifting and unannounced ratios of assessed to fair market value
employed within and among counties. A California assembly commit-
tee put it this way:
For many years, California property owners have paid their ever-
increasing property tax under a set of laws written primarily by the
assessor and for the assessor's greatest convenience. There was
no central agency with authority for the implementation of the
9. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9.
10. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 10, 14 (1910).
11. Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 335, at 530.
12. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 1020, at 2599.
13. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 329, at 1090.
14. Holbrook & O'Neill, The California Property Tax: Proposed Means of Re-
turn to Democratic Principles, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 415, 428-53 (1954); Holbrook &
O'Neill, California Property Tax Trends: 1850-1950 (pt. MI), 25 S. CAL. L. REV.
395 (1952); Holbrook & O'Neill, California Property Tax Trends: 1850-1950 (pt. 11),
24 S. CAL. L. REV. 428, 443-63 (1951).
15. Carr, Need for Disclosure in Property Tax Proceedings, 40 CAL. ST. BJ. 794
(1965); Carr, Property Assessments-Protest, Appeal, and Judicial Review, 39 CAL. ST.
B.J. 877 (1964).
16. Netzer, Some Alternatives in Property Tax Reform, in THE PROPERTY TAX:
PROBLEMS AND PoTEIrls 386 (Tax Institute of America 1967).
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property tax law, and each of the 58 assessors interpreted the
rules developed by the State Board of Equalization as he thought
best. The taxpayer was at the mercy of the administrator and with-
out recourse to the courts except in the case of an obvious violation
of one of the confusing sections of the tax code.17
As the state's population exploded and urban pressures increased,
feelings of unfairness and discrimination became widespread. Unsa-
vory scandals uncovered in 1965 in the offices of four assessors
sparked the explosive reform of California property tax practice and
procedure already smouldering under the surface."8 Thirty-four as-
semblymen joined as coauthors of the assembly bill which, after enact-
ment into law, 19 was popularly known as AB 80. That salutary and
far-reaching reform passed by the 1966 legislature was the most im-
portant procedural transformation of California's property tax since its
beginning in 1849. The law was 41 pages long, contained 105 sec-
tions, and added to or amended five different codes. It was termed
by some "A Bill of Rights for Property Owners."20  Although succeed-
ing legislatures have watered down some of the changes, they have ex-
panded taxpayers' rights in other areas, and the imaginative lawyer's
opportunities in this field are wide open.
Taxpayers' utopia did not arrive with AB 80, of course. As long
as an assessment depends on such a subjective standard as the market
value of an item of property-whether a parcel of real property or an
inventory of used machinery-there will be sharp differences of opin-
ion between the taxpayer and the assessing authorities. What is im-
portant is that value be determined in the same manner for everyone.
As long as the taxpayer is guaranteed the right to know the basis of
the assessor's judgment, and is provided with (1) an impartial and
competent reviewing panel, (2) meaningful appeal under our judicial
system, and (3) the feeling that he is being treated as well as his
neighbor, the procedural safeguards cannot be too harshly criticized.
He will be able at least to determine whether the constitutional require-
ment 2 -the treatment alike of things that are alike-is being met.
17. Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation, Prob-
lems of Property Tax Administration in California 31 (1966), in 1967 APPENDIX TO
THE JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, Vol. 1 [hereinafter cited as 1966 Assembly Report].
18. See generally EHRMAN & FIAVIN, supra note 3, at 38; 1966 Assembly Re-
port, supra note 17, at 31.
19. Cal. Stat. 1966 (1st Extra. Sess. 1966), ch. 147, at 648.
20. E.g., 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 31.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
H. The New Look in Administrative Remedies
A. At the Assessor's Level
Generally, an assessor will defend his assessment as vigorously
as a mother protecting her children. The taxpayer-and his lawyer-
have the burden of piercing that defense if they feel the property has
been unfairly assessed. There are two avenues of administrative ap-
peal: direct negotiations with the assessor resulting in a stipulation
with him, 22 or an application for reduction and a hearing before the
local board of equalization. 23  Both remedies have become more ef-
fective due to radical reform in the past 4 years. The principal changes
are described below.
(1) Written Stipulation
Formerly, once the assessment roll had been delivered to the au-
ditor, there was no procedure for obtaining formal concurrence from
the assessor when seeking a reduction of an assessment.24 Since 1967,
however, the assessor has been allowed to enter into a written stipula-
tion with the taxpayer after reconsidering the value of the taxpayer's
property.25 The stipulation may then be presented to the local board
of equalization.2" The stipulation must be signed by the county legal
officer as well as the assessor and it must set forth the reason for the
reduction.
This reform relieves the taxpayer of the burden under prior law
of making an appearance and presenting a case even though the as-
sessor had concurred in a reduction. Although the board need not
accept the stipulated valuation,28 it normally does. The written stipula-
tion, therefore, is the aim of negotiations with the assessor.
(2) The Standard, Publicly Announced Ratio
The most important procedural reform of the century could be
thought of as a matter of substantive law. In fact, however, it is
merely a legislative assertion of what the courts have long held the law
to be. This reform was simply a direction to county assessors to pro-
22. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 1608. See text accompanying notes 24-73 infra.
23. Id. § 1607. See text accompanying notes 74-123 infra.
24. EHmxAN & FLAviN, supra note 3, at 436.
25. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 1608.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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ceed legally-that is, to assess all property uniformly in proportion to
its value. Specifically, Revenue and Taxation Code section 401 now
requires each county assessor to establish a standard ratio of assessed
value to full case value.2 9 This ratio must be announced publicly;
by 1971 the ratio in each county must be 25 percent.30
The whole idea of an assessment at less than full cash value (mar-
ket value) is contrary to a literal reading of the constitutional directive
that "[a]ll property subject to taxation shall be assessed for taxation
at its full cash value."'" As a matter of fact, however, fractional as-
sessment was the practice in California in every county right from the
beginning.3 2  The practice was recognized by the California Supreme
Court as early as 1890,33 but it wasn't until 1967 that the court, in
County of Sacramento v. Hickman,34 expressly approved the practice.
That decision, based on the long administrative practice and the new
standard and uniform fraction provided in Revenue and Taxation Code
section 401, has been questioned in strong terms.35
The importance of the standard and publicly announced assess-
ment ratio can hardly be exaggerated. Prior to 1966, many assessors
used ratios of their choice-illegally applying different ratios to differ-
ent classes of property, changing these ratios from year to year, and
keeping secret from the taxpayers what ratios were being applied to his
property. In one county, the assessor assessed residential property at
10.9 percent and commercial properties at double that rate.36 Asses-
sors could hide behind the fluctuating ratio to excuse unequal assess-
ments.
Now, not only must the ratio be uniformly applied and publicly
announced by the county assessor, but in addition the State Board of
29. Formerly, this section provided that all taxable property was to be assessed at
its full cash value. Cal. Stat. 1939, ch. 154, § 401, at 1285.
30. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 401.
31. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 12.
32. EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 28-29.
33. San Jose & A.R.R. v. Mayne, 83 Cal. 566, 570, 23 P. 522, 523 (1890).
34. 66 Cal. 2d 841, 428 P.2d 593, 59 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1967).
35. E.g., Hagman, Book Review, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1613 (1968). The reason-
ing underlying that decision had been previously subject to strong criticism. Michels
v. Watson, 229 Cal. App. 2d 404, 416-26, 40 Cal. Rptr. 464, 471-78 (1964) (Fourt,
J., dissenting); Tideman, Fractional Assessments-Do Our Courts Sanction Inequality?,
16 HASTINGS L.J. 573 (1965).
36. Report of the Senate Fact Finding Committee on Revenue and Taxation,
Property Taxes and Other Local Revenue Sources 99 (1965), in 1965 SuPP. TO THE
APPENDIX OF THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE.
37. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 401.
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Equalization must independently determine what it considers the aver-
age ratio for each county each year and make its figure public on the
third Monday in July.38 This means that the taxpayer now has the
burden only of showing what the market value of his property is, since
the assessed value must be the announced fraction of true market value.
Formerly, it was up to the taxpayer to show that he was assessed at
a higher ratio than other property in the county-a practical impossi-
bility. As the Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation
pointed out, "It is absurd to give the taxpayer the right to appeal and
then completely frustrate this right by requiring him to make impossible
proofs."'3
9
By 1970 all but eight counties had announced a 25 percent ratio
4 0
and the State Board of Equalization's survey showed the range of actual
ratios to be within 6 percent of that figure. 1
There is one continuing violation of the standard ratio principle-
the assessment ratio for utility properties. These properties are as-
sessed by the State Board of Equalization rather than the county as-
sessor.42 They had been assessed for many years at 50 percent of mar-
ket value. To avoid a dramatic shift of the tax burden from utilities
to owners of locally assessed property, the Board has made a gradual
reduction in the utility property assessment ratio. By 1969, it was
assessing the operating properties of most utilities at 33 percent.43
(3) Access to Information
Before 1967 two major barriers denied the taxpayer an effective
remedy in case of an unfair assessment. First, he could not obtain
meaningful information from the assessor as to the basis of the assess-
ment and therefore had no handle for an attack.44 Second, even if he
pried loose some data, it was often useless in an appeal to the local
board of equalization because of the deficiencies of these bodies.
4 5
38. Id. § 1817.
39. 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 53.
40. The eight counties are: Fresno (22%), Humboldt (24%), Imperial (23%),
Marin (23%), Napa (22.5%), Sacramento (23.6%), Siskiyou (23%), and Stanislaus
(20%). Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Information Release, April 8, 1970; CCH
STATE TAX RmP.-CALrF. 71-001 (1970).
41. See Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Information Release, Aug. 20, 1970,
modified by State Bd. order to Alpine County Bd. of Supervisors, Sept. 16, 1970.
42. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
43. [1968-1969] CAL. ST. BD. oF EQUAL ZATiON ANN. REP. 10.
44. See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
45. See text accompanying notes 84-88 infra.
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Until 1961, except for a general state policy in favor of disclosure
of information in a public official's possession,46 the taxpayer's only
right to inspect the assessor's records came from the negative statement
that "any information and records in the assessor's office which are
not required by law to be kept or prepared by the assessor are not
public documents and shall not be open to public inspection."4  Under
that provision, assessors generally maintained that the only records
open to inspection were map books and the assessment roll.48
The 1961 amendment to Revenue and Taxation Code section 408
ordered the assessors to permit an assessee to inspect
any information and records, whether or not required to be kept or
prepared by the assessor, relating to the appraisal and the assess-
ment of his property, except information and records which also re-
late to the property or business affairs of a person other than the
assessee . . . 49
The 1966 reform extended this right to include the possibility of se-
curing a court order to permit inspection of records relating to the
property or business affairs of another taxpayer.50
The 1969 legislature further broadened the right of inspection by
requiring the assessor to provide "market data" to a taxpayer who re-
quests it.5 "Market data" means
any information in the assessor's possession, whether or not re-
quired to be prepared or kept by him, relating to the sale of any
property comparable to the property of the assessee, if the assessor
bases his assessment of the assessee's property . . . on such com-
parable sale or sales. 52
The assessor has to give the taxpayer the name of the buyer and seller,
location, date of sale, and the consideration paid for the property. The
only limitation is that he may not show the taxpayer "any document
relating to the business affairs or property of another."53  It should be
46. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1892; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54950.
47. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408(a).
48. EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 47; Holbrook & O'Neill, California Prop-
erty Tax Trends: 1850-1950 (pt. III), 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 395, 411-16 (1952).
49. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408(b), amended by Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1076,
§ 1, at 2809.
50. Id., amended by Cal. Stat. 1966 (1st Extra. Sess. 1966), ch. 147, § 36, at 660.
There are many unsolved problems in securing such a court order. See EHRMAN &
FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 239-49 and text accompanying notes 179-88 infra.
51. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408(b), amended by Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1399,
§ 1, at 2841.
52. Id. § 408(d).
53. Id.
[Vol. 22
noted that few assessors volunteer the information," and the attorney
has to be aware he can demand it.
The taxpayer also has the right under 1970 legislation to inspect
market data in the hands of the State Board of Equalization when his
property has been appraised as part of an intercounty equalization sur-
vey.55  The assessee must, however, inspect the matter at a Board
division office within 30 days of notification that the Board has so ap-
praised his property.
This market-data provision is an extremely important weapon in
the taxpayer's arsenal. No longer may an assessor, hiding behind a
pledge of secrecy, refuse to tell the taxpayer on what comparable sale
he relied, then introduce the sales as evidence at the equalization hear-
ing.
(4) Information Regarding the Assessment
Prior to the enactment of AB 80 the taxpayer often had trouble
finding out-before receiving his tax bill-the assessed value of his
property, the market value the assessor had placed on it, and the method
of valuation used.5" The only requirement for notification of the tax-
payer under prior law was in the case of an increase in the assessment
of 25 percent or more.57 If the taxpayer first learned about the assess-
ment when he got his tax bill in November, it was too late to appeal,
because the county board of supervisors did not meet to equalize prop-
erty assessments after the third Monday of the preceding July.58  In
addition, since the tax bill often went to a lending institution rather
than to the owner, on occasion the homeowner knew only that his
monthly loan payments had been increased and was unaware of the
higher assessment.59
Under present law, by July 1 the assessor must notify every prop-
erty owner of the new assessment, the ratio of assessed value to fair
market value, the proposed full cash value of the property, and how
and when the taxpayer can protest the assessment. 0 A lawyer may
properly ask clients to review their new assessments and to contact
54. EHRMw & FLAViN, supra note 3, at 46-48; Holbrook & O'Neill, California
Property Tax Trends: 1850-1950 (pt. I1), 25 S. CAL. L. REv. 395, 411-16 (1952).
55. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 1820.
56. EHRMAN & FLAViN, supra note 3, at 48.
57. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 2109, § 1, at 4386.
58. Cal. Stat. 1939, ch. 1008, § 8, at 2792.
59. 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 47.
60. CAL. Rnv. & TAx. CODE § 619.
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him promptly in case of an apparent unjustified increase. He should
also be aware of the remedies of a taxpayer who has not received the
required notice from the assessor. 1
(5) Exchange of Information
Another aid to the property taxpayer's attempt to secure equity
is a 1969 law providing for an exchange of information between a
protesting taxpayer and the assessor.6 2 If the taxpayer has filed an ap-
plication for reduction, he may submit the information on which he
bases his own opinion of the value of his property to the assessor at
least 20 days before the equalization hearing. The assessor must then,
at least 10 days before the hearing, reciprocate with the information on
which he based the assessment. After such an exchange, the use of
additional evidence at the hearing is strictly limited. 3
Since the taxpayer can secure much information from the assessor
without disclosing his own data,64 he may be unnecessarily limiting his
presentation by initiating an exchange. Nevertheless, it may be a use-
ful alternative procedure and a means of discovering the assessor's
case. 
65
(6) Notification of Values in Property Statements
A statute added in 196966 requires the assessor, at the taxpayer's
request, to disclose by July 15 the assessor's determination of the full
cash value of each category of personal property reported by the tax-
payer under Revenue and Taxation Code section 441. This breakdown
is of special utility to businesses with assets subject to depreciation and
obsolescence, as well as to those businesses with fluctuating inventories.
(7) State Board Valuation Rules
The State Board of Equalization has been ordered by the legisla-
61. Id. § 620. See also EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 39-40 (Supp. 1969).
62. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1608.7. The information which can be obtained
by use of this procedure includes detail under every valuation method. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 408.
65. For a more complete discussion of this new discovery substitute, its advan-
tages, disadvantages, and alternatives, see EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 69,
72-73 (Supp. 1969).
66. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 443.1. To obtain the benefits of this statute, the
taxpayer need only file his property statement in a timely manner and in duplicate
"with a request that the assessor mark on the duplicate statement opposite each cate-
gory of property reported on the statement, the full cash value of such category of
property as determined by the assessor ....... Id.
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ture to prescribe rules and regulations for the valuation of property;
these rules and regulations are binding on the assessor.67  Formerly,
the guidelines issued by the Board (mostly in the form of the Assessors'
Handbook,8 a complete and competent work) were just that-sugges-
tions. 0 The assessor was still free to use any method of valuation he
wished, subject only to a limited court review if his method were clearly
arbitrary.70
The new Board rules, contained in the Administrative Code,
71
are public information available to the taxpayer and his lawyer. They
provide the means by which the taxpayer can detect any departure by
the assessor from the required standards.
(8) Legislative Standards of Comparability
The 1969 legislature provided standards of comparability binding
on county assessors and the State Board of Equalization when using a
comparable-sales method of valuation.72 Although in a sense this legis-
lation is simply a restatement of generally recognized principles of ap-
praisal, it sets out specific criteria which must be met before the tax-
payer's property may be valued by a comparison with the sale of another
piece of property. The sale must be sufficiently near in time to the lien
date, and the property sold must be sufficiently close geographically
and sufficiently alike in character, size, usability, and legal restrictions
to the taxpayer's property to make it clear that the cash equivalent price
of the other piece of property does, in fact, shed light upon the value
of the taxpayer's property.
73
B. Appeals to Local Boards of Equalization
If negotiation with the assessor has not resulted in a stipulation,
the next remedy is to appeal to the local board of equalization. This
may be the county board of supervisors, or, in some counties, a spe-
cially constituted assessment appeals board consisting of three full-time
members.74
The right to notice and a hearing on a property tax assessment is
67. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 15606.
68. CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, ASSESSORS' HANDBOOK (1948-1968).
69. EHRMAN & FLAViN, supra note 3, at 45-46.
70. See text accompanying notes 124-31 infra.
71. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, §§ 1-41 (1970).
72. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 402.5, 1815.4.
73. Id.
74. CAL. Rnv. & TAx. CODE § 1603.
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a constitutional right; a denial of that right is a denial of due process. 75
Every taxpayer is entitled to have his assessment "equalized." In other
words, the assessment should be adjusted so that it is neither higher nor
lower than other assessments in proportion to the value of the property
assessed. Nevertheless, in practically every case the first step in seeking
equalization should be negotiation with the assessor. In such discus-
sions, the taxpayer can determine whether he has a case worth pursuing
and what the assessor's case is. This approach is not always possible,
however, since sometimes it is too late for the assessor to make a
change in the assessment. 76
It has been held that a taxpayer need not apply for relief to a
local board of equalization before going to court when the property
is wholly exempt from tax, 77 outside the jurisdiction, 78 nonexistent,"9
or when the statute is unconstitutional.8 0  As a matter of practice, how-
ever, it probably is best to apply to the administrative board for a re-
duction in every case."' Such a course seems advisable in light of a
recent opinion of the California Supreme Court which stated:
If any question of valuation exists, it would be irrelevant that
plaintiff also challenges the assessment as "arbitrary" or void on
constitutional grounds. [Citations omitted.] If prior recourse to
the board on the question of valuation might have avoided the
necessity of deciding the constitutional issue, or modified its na-
ture, plaintiff's action was properly dismissed.8 2
75. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934); Bandini Estate Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227-30, 82 P.2d 185, 187-88 (1938).
76. An assessor has no jurisdiction to make changes in the assessment role on
his own authority once the roll has been delivered to the auditor, except to correct cer-
tain types of errors not involving the assessor's exercise of judgment as to value.
Savings & Loan Soc'y v. City & County of San Francisco, 146 Cal. 673, 676, 80 P.
1086, 1088 (1905); 46 CAL. JuR. 2D Taxation § 192, at 707 (1959). See CAL. REV.
& TAx. CODE §§ 4831, 4832, 4840 for kinds of corrections specifically allowed by
statute.
77. Brenner v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 72, 116 P. 397 (1911); Parrott &
Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 131 Cal. App. 2d 332, 341-42, 280 P.2d 881,
887-88 (1955).
78. Kern River Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 164 Cal. 751, 755-56, 130 P. 714,
715 (1913).
79. Pacific Coast Co. v. Wells, 134 Cal. 471, 66 P. 657 (1901); Associated Oil
Co. v. County of Orange, 4 Cal. App. 2d 5, 40 P.2d 887 (1935).
80. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Quinn, 54 Cal. 2d 507, 354 P.2d 1, 6 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1960). See generally EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 471-73.
81. EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 472-73; Early, Local Equalization Prac-
tice in California, 4 SANTA CLARA LAW. 147, 149-52 (1964); Holbrook & O'Neill,
California Property Tax Trends: 1850-1950 (pt. II), 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 428, 460-63
(1951).
82. Stenocord Corp. v. City & County of San Francisco, 2 Cal. 3d 984, 988, 471
P.2d 966, 969, 88 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1970).
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The improvements in taxpayer remedies in local equalization pro-
cedures becomes strikingly clear when one reads the 1964 article by
Alexander R. Early which authoritatively summarizes the situation be-
fore the procedural reform."3 The most significant improvements in
the procedural aspect of appeals to local boards of equalization are
discussed below.
(1) Assessment Appeals Board
Prior to 1962, the equalizing body in all counties was the board
of supervisors.8 4 Political pressures, need for county revenues, dearth
of experience among the supervisors in tax and valuation matters, and
lack of time to hear complex cases generally render these local elective
officials inadequate for this purpose. Criticism was widespread.8  A
1962 constitutional amendment authorized the legislature to create spe-
cial appointive three-man appeals boards to hear taxpayers' protests of
their assessments in counties with a population of 400,000 or more.86
The legislature followed through with Revenue and Taxation Code
sections 1620 to 1630; special provisions for Los Angeles County were
also added in sections 1750 to 1765. In 1966 the constitutional pro-
vision was amended to authorize special assessment appeals boards in
all counties.8 7  The operation of such boards, however, is costly, and
only 10 of the state's 58 counties had created them by fiscal year 1969-
1970.88
In those counties having assessment appeals boards, the additional
time available for consideration of appeals, the partial insulation from
county fiscal needs and other political pressures, and the increased ex-
pertise have provided taxpayers with an effective remedy. There is,
however, room for improvement in both the qualification standards for
board membership and in the procedures used by some of the boards.
83. Early, Local Equalization Practice in California, 4 SANTA CLARA LAw. 147
(1964).
84. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9.
85. E.g., 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 52-57; Final Report of the
Joint Interim Committee on Assessment Practices 38 (1959), in 1959 APPENDIx TO
THE JOuRNAL OF THE SENATE, Vol. 1; Carr, Property Assessments-Protest, Appeal,
and Judicial Review, 39 CAL. ST. B.J. 877, 882-83 (1964); Holbrook & O'Neill,
California Property Tax Trends: 1850-1950 (pt.H), 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 428, 446-48
(1951).
86. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9.5 (1962).
87. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9.5.
88. EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, app. § 8, at 106-07 (Supp. 1969). The ten
counties are: Alameda, Los Angeles, Marin, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino,
San Diego, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara.
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The 1969 legislature provided an additional safeguard by giving a tax-
payer-and the assessor-the right to disqualify a board member.89
(2) Assessment Hearing Officer
A new level of hearing has been added by the 1970 legislature,
although its use is optional with the taxpayer and it is limited to prop-
erties with an assessed value of $12,500 or less.90 This is a hearing
before an "assessment hearing officer."'" The county board of super-
visors may appoint one or more assessment hearing officers,92 and each
hearing officer must have the qualifications set out for assessment ap-
peals board members. 93 A hearing before an assessment hearing offi-
cer may be requested by a taxpayer who has properly filed an applica-
tion for reduction on property within the jurisdictional amount. 94
Neither the taxpayer nor the board is bound by the recommenda-
tion of the hearing officer. If the taxpayer agrees with the recommen-
dation, he may request the board to accept it, which it can then do
without further testimony.95 If he disagrees, he may make application
within 21 days after the officer's decision for a full hearing by the
board.96
(3) Extension of Period for Filing and Hearing Protests
A further measure to make local equalization hearings more mean-
ingful was the extension of the period for filing and hearing assessment
protests. Before 1967, even though the assessment was not placed on
the roll until July 1,97 a taxpayer had to file his application for re-
duction in assessment before the third Monday in July. The hearing
period was limited to 2 weeks in July.98 It is obvious that a taxpayer
89. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 1624.3.
90. Id. § 1637.
91. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27720; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1636.
92. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 1636. If the county board of supervisors so de-
sires, it may contract with the Office of Administrative Procedure for the services of
a hearing officer. Id.
93. Id. § 1624.
94. Id. § 1638.
95. Id. § 1641.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 616.
98. Cal. Stat. 1939, ch. 154, § 1603, at 1302, as amended, CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE § 1603. Not all counties limited their hearings to those periods. The California
Supreme Court held that the limitation was directive only, and the board could function
after the expiration of the prescribed period. Universal Consol. Oil Co. v. Byram,
25 Cal. 2d 353, 362, 153 P.2d 746, 752 (1944).
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could not prepare and that a harried board of supervisors could not
completely hear cases of any complexity in such a short period.
The 1970 legislature provided that in counties of the second to
ninth classes inclusive (Alameda, Orange, Sacramento, San Diego, San
Bernardino, San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara)99 the period
for filing protests is from July 2 to September 15. In Los Angeles
County it is from the third Monday in July to September 15.100 In all
other counties it is from July 2 to August 26.101 This gives the tax-
payer or his attorney adequate time to investigate the assessment, nego-
tiate with the assessor, and, if necessary, prepare a proper application
for reduction. The local boards of equalization now hear appeals
"until the business of equalization is disposed of."' 02
Local boards generally conduct no hearings before the final date
for filing the application. The State Board of Equalization rules pro-
vide that the local boards need not conduct any hearings prior to that
deadline.'0 3
(4) Availability of State Board Ratios
During the equalization period, the standard ratio required by
Revenue and Taxation Code section 401 assumes overriding impor-
tance to the protesting taxpayer. 04 Previously, before the assessor was
required to make public the ratio at which he was assessing, the tax-
payer had no way to prove that his property was not properly assessed.
Although the taxpayer might have proven a certain market value, the
assessor could assert that he was using a ratio of assessed to full cash
value which, applied to that proven market value, would result in the
figure entered on the assessment roll. The only way a taxpayer could
challenge the ratio was by doing a county-wide appraisal himself. Such
a requirement is obviously ridiculous on its face.
Under AB 80, not only must the assessor announce his standard
ratio, 105 but the State Board of Equalization must also make its own
independent determination of the actual ratio used by the assessor for
99. "[Tlhe several counties of the State are classified according to their popu-
lation . . . ." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 28021. For a breakdown of California counties
by population and the population requirement for classes one through nine, see CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 28020, 28022-30.
100. CAL. Rnv. & TAx. CODE § 1607.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 1603.
103. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, § 309 (1969).
104. See text accompanying notes 29-43 supra.
105. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 401.
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each county and announce that finding publicly not later than August
23.1° This means that the taxpayer knows the Board's ratio by
the time the equalization hearings begin." 7
The local board of equalization is now required to establish the
assessed value of the protesting taxpayer's property at the lowest of:
(1) an amount based on the county assessor's announced ratio; (2)
an amount based on 115 percent of the board's announced ratio; (3)
an amount based on the actual ratio of all property in the county.0 8
Since the ratios of the State Board of Equalization and the county as-
sessors are now publicly available, the only burden on the taxpayer is
to show the true value of his property. An assessment is automatically
equalized once the local board of equalization has determined the mar-
ket value.
(5) Subpoena Powers and Written Findings
A further procedural reform in aid of the taxpayer's effort to se-
cure effective relief is the 1966 revision' 0 9 that enables the local board
of equalization to subpoena books, records, maps, and documents, as
well as witnesses. The State Board of Equalization rules give the tax-
payer the right to require the local board to issue such subpoenas."0
The taxpayer may also have the board make written findings of
fact that must set out all material points, including a statement of the
method or methods of valuation it used in redetermining the assess-
ment."' If the attorney is diligent in securing proper findings, he will
have laid a good foundation for judicial appeal.
(6) Two-Year Presumption
The value placed on the roll by the assessor is presumed correct,
and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove it wrong." 2  Thus, the tax-
payer must present to the board of equalization independent evidence
106. Id. § 1815, 1817-19.
107. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra. There are other uses for these
State Board ratios; e.g., to determine state equalization aid for school districts, CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 17261; school district debt limits, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 21701; library
district debt limitations, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 27956; and taxes in intercounty districts
other than school districts, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE H§ 2131-34.
108. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1605.
109. Id. § 1609.
110. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, § 322 (1969).
111. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1605.5.
112. Utah Constr. Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 654-55, 203 P. 401, 403-04
(1921); CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, § 321(a) (1969).
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of the value of his property, instead of merely knocking down the as-
sessor's case." 3
The legislature has relieved the taxpayer of this burden of proof
in some cases. One is the case of a penalty assessment, where the
burden is on the assessor.1 4  The more important exception to the
general rule is a 1968 statute intended to relieve the taxpayer of the
burden of fighting a stubborn or vengeful assessor who refuses to ac-
cept the judgment of the local board. When the board changes the
assessed value of a parcel of real property in either of 2 preceding
years from the value as reflected on the assessment roll, or as recom-
mended, proposed, or stipulated by the assessor, the value for the cur-
rent year is rebuttably presumed to be that which was determined by
the board."' If within 2 years the board again makes a change in the
assessed value of the property, the new value set by the board benefits
from the presumption for another 2 years.
The presumption does not apply if the board merely accepts, but
does not change, a stipulated valuation agreed upon by the taxpayer
and the assessor under Revenue and Taxation Code section 1608.
Nor does it apply if the zoning or use by use permit has been changed,
the assessed value was changed due to an inter-county equalization
order of the State Board of Equalization, or there has been a physical
change for which a permit was required. The presumption does not
apply to property under initial construction, trade fixtures, or property
given relief from assessment because of damage due to a major dis-
aster." The State Board of Equalization has issued detailed regula-
tions regarding notices and other procedural matters in connection with
this presumption.".
(7) Recognition of Enforceable Restrictions
An enforceable restriction on the use of land obviously affects the
113. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 1605. The requirement that the taxpayer pro-
duce independent evidence to overcome the presumption is one on which many a tax-
payer has stubbed his toe. Recent examples of a taxpayer's defeat, despite an ad-
mittedly unconvincing assessor's case, are found in Jones Lumber Corp. v. Brickwedel,
274 A.C.A. 723, 79 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1969), and Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. v. County
of Los Angeles, 260 Cal. App. 2d 679, 67 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1968).
114. CAL.. An. CODE tit. 18, § 321(a) (1969).
115. CAL.. REV. & TAx. CODE § 1616.
116. Id. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.8, provides that property damaged by a
major misfortune or calamity may be reassessed after the lien date of a given tax year
if the government subsequently declares the area in which the property was located to
be in a state of disaster.
117. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, § 305.5 (1969).
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value of the land. Formerly, the assessor often ignored the depressing
effect of restrictions by assuming that because the restriction might be
modified or lifted in the near future, it did not really affect the market
value of the property as compared with otherwise similar property."'
The 1966 legislature imposed on the assessor the burden of proving
that an enforceable restriction on use might be removed or substan-
tially modified in the predictable future if he wished to ignore the re-
striction in assessing the property. Otherwise, he must value it only on
the basis of the permitted uses.' 19
The presumption that the restrictions will not be removed or sub-
stantially modified in the predictable future is rebuttable by the assessor.
If he cannot overcome the presumption with a preponderance of the
evidence, he may not base the assessment on sales of otherwise com-
parable land not subject to similar restrictions.2 0 Alternatively, the
assessor may try to show that the restrictions have a minimal effect on
the value of the parcel being assessed.' 2'
To help the taxpayer take advantage of the presumption, the legis-
lature also provided that he may introduce as evidence at a local board
of equalization hearing a written statement from the local governing
body declaring that it does not intend to modify or remove the re-
striction in the predictable future.'2 2 That statement then constitutes
a rebuttable presumption in favor of the taxpayer.
21
118. EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 262.
119. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1. Enforceable restrictions include, but are
not necessarily limited to, zoning and "any recorded contractual provisions limiting
the use of lands entered into with a governmental agency pursuant to state laws or
applicable local ordinances." Id. This would include contracts under the William-
son Act (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-95) and the Open-Space Easement Law (Id.
§§ 51050-65). Whether or not restrictions in private agreements are included is an
open question. See text accompanying notes 189-92 infra.
120. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1630.
123. Id. § 1630(d). The 1970 legislature created two new rebuttable presump-
tions binding the assessor in his appraisal of Williamson Act land. One is that the
present agricultural use of the restricted land is its highest and best agricultural use,
CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 431. The purpose is to prevent assessors from claiming a
farmer should be raising a more profitable crop. The other provides that "prudent
management" does not include recreational use of farm land, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 423. This section is designed to keep assessors from assessing potential hunting
rights on a farm if the farmer does not in fact lease such rights.
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1H. New Look in Judicial Review of Assessments
A. The Former Situation
Although judicial review of the actions of an assessor is not a due
process requirement, 124 some court proceeding under certain circum-
stances is provided in every state.12 5 Until 1969 California had been
among those states which limited judicial review of the findings of a
local board of equalization to cases of fraud, arbitrary action, or an
abuse of discretion.126  California, indeed, was one of the few states
where the taxpayer's appeal of the value placed on the roll by the as-
sessor ended for all practical purposes with the local board of equaliza-
tion. More than half the states allow the taxpayer to appeal his assess-
ment to a state agency and many others provide judicial review on
factual questions. 127
The narrow scope of judicial review in California was widely criti-
cized.Y28 As one writer pointed out:
While a limited scope of review of the judgments of quasi-judicial
bodies is not at all unusual, it does not seem appropriate in this
case in view of the fundamental differences between the local
boards of equalization and typical administrative tribunals.
Whether property has been unequally assessed is not a policy-
laden issue. It is, rather, a highly technical question which the
members of the board quite generally lack the expertise to consider
properly.129
It was generally conceded that a decision of the local board of equali-
zation was like a trial court decision' which, in the absence of fraud
or abuse of discretion, is conclusive.' 3 '
124. Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1905).
125. See Hellerstein, The Appeal Machinery in Property Taxation, in PROCEEDINGS
OF FIFTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE-NATIONAL TAx ASSOCIATION 429 (1958), for
an overview of appellate procedures in property taxation throughout the country. For
a more recent survey see AssEssoas INFORMATION DIGEST, May 1967, at 1-12.
126. E.g., Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal. 2d 1, 229 P.2d 345 (1951);
McClelland v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. 2d 124, 128-30, 180 P.2d 676, 679-80,
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 823-24 (1947).
127. See note 125 supra.
128. E.g., 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 57; Holbrook & O'Neill, The
California Property Tax: Proposed Means of Return to Democratic Principles, 27
S. CAL. L. REv. 415, 430 (1954).
129. Carr, Property Assessments-Protest, Appeal, and Judicial Review, 39 CAL.
ST. B.J. 877, 883-84 (1964).
130. McClelland v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. 2d 124, 128-30, 180 P.2d 676,
679-80 (1947).
131. Id.; Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 497,
503-05, 161 P.2d 407, 411-12 (1945).
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B. The Present Situation
Until 1968 California could be classified with the more restrictive
states.132 The 1968 legislature made the first inroads on the position
of the local board of equalization as the court of last resort. It added
to the section governing equalization hearings the following language:
"At the hearing the final determinations by the board shall be sup-
ported by the weight of the evidence."13  Although this amendment
did not go so far as to call for a trial de novo in superior court, it does
seem to have substituted the so-called "independent judgment" or
"weight of the evidence" test for the "substantial evidence" test in prop-
erty tax court appeals.134
The "substantial evidence" test has been described as calling for
the court to examine the record below to see whether there was any
evidence from which a reasonable man acting reasonably might have
reached the same decision as the local board. 135  The "weight of the
evidence" test, on the other hand, requires the court to review the
record and substitute its independent judgment for that of the local
board-in other words, to reweigh the evidence produced at the hear-
ing. 3 ' The above definitions of these terms are usually applied in the
setting of pure administrative proceedings, whereas local boards of
equalization are acting in a judicial capacity. 37  However, the 1968
legislative addition to Revenue and Taxation Code section 1605.5,
quoted above, would be rendered meaningless by any other interpreta-
tion. The section as amended uses the mandatory "shall be supported,"
and its meaning seems clear.
Ironically, perhaps, support for the view that California's admin-
istrative mandamus rules 3 ' apply to local equalization proceedings is
found in a case in which the assessor appealed a local board's decision
granting a reduction. 139 The court, although recognizing the constitu-
132. See note 125 supra.
133. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1605.5.
134. See generally ERHMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, at 78 (Supp. 1969).
135. A.F. Gilmore Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. App. 2d 471, 477,
9 Cal. Rptr. 67, 72 (1960).
136. The differences between the two tests are discussed in CALIFORNIA ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE MANDAMUS §§ 5.74-.75 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1966). See also Netterville,
Judicial Review: The "Independent Judgment" Anomaly, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 262,
277-80 (1956); Netterville, The Substantial Evidence Rule in California Administra-
tive Law, 8 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1956).
137. A.F. Gilmore Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. App. 2d 471, 476, 9
Cal. Rptr. 67, 71 (1960).
138. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5.
139. County of Los Angeles v. Tax Appeals Bd. No. 2, 267 Cal. App. 2d 830,
73 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1968).
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tional and quasi-judicial nature of assessment appeals boards, said:
Whatever may be the rule in jurisdictions where no express statu-
tory provision has been made for reviewing the orders of adminis-
trative agencies, or other bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers,
it is clear that such review is provided in California by Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5.140
The court did not reach the issue of whether a board of supervisors,
when acting as a board of equalization, should be considered the same
as an assessment appeals board for this purpose. 4' It did, however,
recognize that members of boards of supervisors, when sitting as a
board of equalization, compose a distinct constitutional body even
though the persons are the same.'
The new statutory requirement means, in effect, that the court
must stand in the shoes of the local board and decide on its own
whether the determination below was in fact proper and in accordance
with the weight the reviewing court gives to evidence produced at the
equalization hearing. Thus, although the reform as it regards judicial
review has not gone as far as some would like, 143 California has now
joined the national trend toward liberalization of the right to judicial
review of assessments.
IV. Possibilities for Further Reform
This article limits its discussion of other possible improvements
in California's property tax system to procedural matters. There are,
indeed, many areas of substantive law in which the people, the legis-
lature, and the courts can contribute to the fight for equity in property
taxation. For example, widespread abuse and deception in the field of
exemptions (most of which are disguised subsidies) cry out for reform.
In the field of procedure, despite the fact that the law has come a long
way in the last 4 years, numerous recommendations made by commen-
tators in the past deserve consideration.
A. State Tax Court
One recurring thought calls for the establishment of a state tax
court which, in the view of some, would hear not only property tax
140. Id. at 833, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
141. Id. at 834, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 471-72.
142. Id. at 834, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
143. It is the author's understanding that the State Board of Equalization, in its
proposed property tax reform package for 1970, had initially included the idea of a de
novo judicial review of property tax assessment appeals, but eliminated the recommen-
dation from its final proposal because of pressure from assessors.
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appeals but also appeals from the imposition of other taxes. 144  In
1945, a proposal for a state court of tax appeals was put on the ballot
as a constitutional amendment.' 45  The voters defeated it. In 1955,
an assembly committee suggested that an administrative board of tax
appeals be established, 46 and the Governor's Committee on Organiza-
tion of State Government suggested in 1959 that the State Board of
Equalization should function as a board of tax appeals. 4 7
In 1964 another commentator, hailing a "trend toward the estab-
lishment of independent appellate bodies with exclusive jurisdiction of
tax controversies,"148 suggested that the "litigation of property tax dis-
putes . . . be transferred to a state tax court with jurisdiction to adjust
discrepancies and a small claims division to expedite matters."' 49
Richard Nevins, a State Board of Equalization member testifying be-
fore the Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation in 1963, pro-
posed a system of tax courts to handle assessment reviews. 50 These
courts, rather than the superior court, would take appeals directly from
the local board of equalization.
Although a state tax court system might have its merits, and has
been operating successfully in states such as Wisconsin,'' Massachu-
setts, 152 and New Jersey,' 53 it is the author's opinion that a more lib-
eralized judicial review in the existing court system, combined with
more expertise at the local level, should provide adequate relief. The
assignment of property tax cases to judges with special experience would
be preferable to creation of a new layer of judiciary.
144. See, e.g., Holbrook & O'Neill, The California Property Tax: Proposed Means
of Return to Democratic Principles, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 415, 450-53 (1954), in which
the authors recommended that a special appellate body with statewide jurisdiction be
established.
145. Assembly Constitutional Amendment 39, Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 150, at 3165.
146. Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Government Organization, The
Need for a Department of Revenue in California 29, 37, A-27 (1955), in 1955 JOURNAL
OF THE ASSEMBLY, vol. 1.
147. Report of the Governor's Committee on Organization of State Government,
The Agency Plan for California 20 (1959).
148. Kray, California Tax Court: An Approach to Progressive Tax Administra-
tion, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 485 (1964).
149. Id. at 497.
150. Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation, Prob-
lems of Property Tax Administration in California 143 (1964), in APPENDIX TO
JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, vol. 1 (1965).
151. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 73.01 (1957).
152. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58A (1958).
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:2-1 to -47 (1960).
[Vol. 22
B. Judicial Trial De Novo
Another frequent recommendation is that the superior court pro-
vide for a trial de novo on a taxpayer's appeal from a local board of
equalization. This is available in a number of states.154  One com-
mentator recommended that a judicial trial de novo be available on the
issue of uniformity of assessments in counties lacking separate assess-
ment appeals boards.' 55 This suggestion was echoed by a legislative
committee which also made an alternative proposal. It suggested al-
lowing appeals to the State Board of Equalization on questions of fact
in counties without an assessment appeals board. 6 The committee
pointed out that an appeal to the judiciary on factual questions is pos-
sible in at least 25 states and that "the long-suffering California prop-
erty-tax payer is denied the legal rights now afforded the income- and
sales-tax payers.' 57
Based on experience with local boards of supervisors in smaller
counties, the author would endorse a wider scope of judicial review in
the absence of more expert and impartial administrative hearings on
value questions.
C. Narrower Margin of Assessor's Error
Since 1967 the taxpayer has had a right to have his assessment
reduced to 115 percent of the ratio determined by the State Board of
Equalization for the county.' 8 In other words, the assessor is allowed
a 15 percent margin of error. Thus, some taxpayers might be assessed
15 percent higher than the county average as determined by the State
Board without being entitled to relief from the local board.
The Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation wanted a
tolerance limit of 10 percent, but the county assessors successfully re-
sisted that proposal.159 Although the present tolerance limit is an as-
sessment utopia compared with the uncontrolled situation in existence
prior to 1966, it still appears unduly high. A 10 percent tolerance
would be fairer to the taxpayers and should not unduly burden the
assessor.
154. See note 125 supra.
155. Carr, Property Assessments-Protest, Appeal, and Judicial Review, 39 CAL.
ST. BJ. 877, 891 (1964).
156. 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 57.
157. Id.
158. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1605,
159. 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 20.
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D. More Frequent State Board Surveys
The present law provides that the State Board of Equalization
sample assessments in each county every 3 years.' Between triennial
physical samplings, the Board projects its full-value estimates by trend-
ing. This involves the adjustment of its prior year's finding on the
basis of changes in school enrollment, retail sales, wages, and other
factors.' 6 '
Because the taxpayer has the right to have his assessment reduced
to 115 percent of the Board's determination of the ratio for his county,
an unduly high trending may deprive him of a reduction to which he
is entitled. The State Board of Equalization felt that trending every 2
years rather than every 3 years would produce more accurate results,162
but the proposal was defeated during the 1966 legislative discussions.
The ostensible reason for making the spot check every 3 years
instead of every 2 years was the additional cost to the state, but there
is some evidence that much, if not all, of the cost would be recaptured
through reassessment of underassessed property.1"3 The 2-year cycle
should be instituted now, and when modem techniques and attendant
technical advantages permit, the survey should be done every year.
E. Qualifications for Assessment Appeals Board
The purpose of creating special assessment appeals boards to sit
in place of boards of supervisors as local equalizing bodies was to
provide expertise and insulation from the pressures of time and poli-
tics.'0 4  The three-man board is appointed by the board of super-
visors, and the original legislation had only one qualification for ap-
pointment as a member-that the nominating supervisor believed him
to be "by experience and training" qualified for the job.0 5 The 1966
legislature added that an assessment appeals board member must have
a minimum of 5 years' professional experience in California as an ac-
countant, a licensed real estate broker, an attorney, or an accredited
160. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 1815.
161. Id. § 1817.
162. Memorandum of H.F. Freeman, Executive Secretary, California State Board
of Equalization, to Hon. John T. Knox, Mar. 29, 1966, in 1966 Assembly Report,
supra note 17, at 29.
163. Id.
164. 1966 Assembly Report, supra note 17, at 35, 54.
165. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 342, § 1, at 1383, as amended, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 1624. The same qualifications apply to assessment hearing officers provided for by
the 1970 legislation. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1636. See text accompanying notes
90-96 supra.
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appraiser, or be "a person who the nominating member of the board of
supervisors has reason to believe is possessed of competent knowledge
of property appraisal and taxation." 6 ' The last phrase, in effect,
opened the door to political appointments without the necessary con-
sideration of expertise.
To carry out the original intent of the law, the door pried open in
1966 should be shut by requiring special qualification in fact instead
of in theory. The author is under no illusion that this would guarantee
a greater number of competent board members, but it would increase
the odds.
F. Provision for Receipt of Confidential Information
In some cases the taxpayer, particularly one in a competitive busi-
ness, has faced a dilemma-should he open up confidential records to
public scrutiny, or should he forego the possibility of relief from an
unfair assessment? Extreme prejudice may result from public dis-
closure of information concerning the value of his property. Even
though the law attempts to protect this kind of information while it is
in the hands of the assessor, there are no similar guarantees of confi-
dentiality under present appellate procedures; 67 thus, the taxpayer may
be unwilling to appeal.
A procedure should be devised by which the taxpayer can make
a showing that he would be seriously damaged by the public disclosure
of information necessary to appeal his case.'6 8 If the showing is con-
vincing to the board, such testimony could be taken in closed session
and that part of the record sealed. There is nothing to prevent a local
board of equalization from adopting such a procedure since each may
adopt its own rules of conduct as long as they do not conflict with State
Board of Equalization rules.' 69
Such a procedure was invoked by the author in an assessment ap-
peal before the board of supervisors in San Benito County in 1969.171
166. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 1624.
167. See the confusing and apparently conflicting provisions regarding con-
fidentiality in CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 408, 451, 1605.1 & 1609.
168. One method for revealing a trade secret in camera and for sealing the record
has been suggested in American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 104 F.2d 863,
865 (6th Cir. 1939).
169. See CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, §§ 302-26 (1969) for the California State Board
of Equalization rules applicable to local boards.
170. In re Granite Rock Co., Hearing on Application for Reduction in Assess-
ment, before the San Benito County Board of Supervisors sitting as a local board of
equalization (November, 1969).
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First, a foundation was laid by testimony from the applicant's president
as to the need for secrecy of certain information. The board of super-
visors then determined that it had the right to close the hearing for the
receipt of such information. Its determination was based in large
part on a 1968 letter from the California Attorney General to the
County Counsel of Butte County,'7 1 stating that a county board of
supervisors sitting as a board of equalization is not bound by the closed
meeting laws. 172  The Attorney General pointed out that such boards
are sitting in a quasi-judicial and not in a legislative capacity, and,
although they are made up of the same individuals, they are wearing
different hats.' 73
In the absence of clear legislative authority, a local board of equali-
zation might be persuaded to adopt a procedure insuring the confi-
dentiality of the taxpayer's proferred evidence by reference to the Cali-
fornia laws protecting trade secrets.' 74  California adheres to the Re-
statement of Torts definition of a trade secret, 175 which includes within
the definition any "compilation of information . . .used in one's busi-
ness . . . which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.' 7 6 The Evidence Code recog-
nizes a privilege to protect trade secrets' 7 in both judicial and nonju-
dicial proceedings.' 78 Therefore, it seems that property valuation in-
formation could, in many instances, qualify for treatment as a trade
secret in hearings held by the board of equalization.
The delicate balance between the public policy of full disclosure
through open hearings and the right of a taxpayer to a meaningful day
in court is one that may be hard to define. The taxpayer has, however,
a basic right to protect himself against an unfair assessment and the
laws should protect that right. Possibly this can be done only by vest-
ing a certain amount of discretion in the local board of equalization.
171. Letter from Attorney General of California to County Counsel of Butte
County, Mar. 6, 1968.
172. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-60.
173. Letter from Attorney General of California to County Counsel of Butte
County, Mar. 6, 1968. This distinction was also made in Napa Say. Bank v. County of
Napa, 17 Cal. App. 545, 548, 120 P. 449, 450 (1911).
174. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060, allowing an owner of a trade secret to refuse
to disclose it, and to prevent others from disclosing it in all proceedings; CAL. CODE
CIv. PROC. § 2019(b)(1), allowing the court to make protective orders prohibiting in-
quiry into secret processes, developments, or research.
175. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
176. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 289, 23 Cal. Rptr.
198, 211 (1962).
177. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1060.
178. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 901, 910 & Comment-Law Revision Comm'n.
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G. Access to Information and Prehearing Discovery
Despite the taxpayer's new and vastly improved opportunities to
secure the information relevant to an assessment protest, 179 he is still
handicapped by the provision that prohibits him from inspecting in-
formation in the assessor's office relating to the assessment of his
property if that information also relates to the property or business af-
fairs of another person. 180 Assessors generally strictly construe this
prohibition in order to deny the taxpayer information. An exception
to the prohibition, added in 1966, is so lacking in definition that it has
proven almost useless. This provision permits the assessee to inspect
information and records relating to the appraisal of his property even
though they also relate to the property or business affairs of another.
The assessor, however, is required to allow such an inspection only if
"ordered to do so by a competent court in a proceeding initiated by
[a] taxpayer seeking to challenge the legality of his assessment."'"
Assuming that such information is needed to prove the taxpayer's
case, how does he secure the authorized court order? Apparently there
is no clear answer. To obtain the court order, the above provision
seems to require the taxpayer to "challenge the legality of his assess-
ment" in the court from which he seeks the order. Herein lies the
dilemma. On the one hand, challenging the assessment by judicial
action prior to the equalization board hearing will generally be held
premature because administrative remedies will not have been ex-
hausted.18 2 On the other hand, challenging the assessment by judicial
action subsequent to the equalization hearing would be futile because
the court will only consider the record of the equalization board hear-ing.183
It has been suggested that the taxpayer might avoid the dilemma
by initiating a court action early in the period for filing applications
for reduction in assessment, and framing the complaint to pose a juris-
dictional question; 8 4 in such a case, administrative remedies need not
be exhausted. The court order for disclosure might then be secured
in that action, and the information obtained in time to be used at an
equalization board hearing. It is doubtful, however, that this ex-
179. See text accompanying notes 44-66 supra.
180. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 408(b), (d).
181. Id. § 408(b).
182. Security-First Nat'l Bank v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 319, 217 P.2d
946 (1950). See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
183. Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 497, 503-
04, 161 P.2d 407, 411 (1945).
184. EHRMAN & FLAviN, supra note 3, at 128-30.
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pensive and disingenuous maneuver is what the legislature had in mind
in providing for disclosure by court order.
A related and unresolved question is whether the taxpayer has
the right to use discovery methods to help prepare his case for an
equalization board hearing. Of some help is the 1969 legislative pro-
vision.8 for securing the assessor's comparable-sales data used to assess
the taxpayer's property. In many cases, however, there are other types
of information (such as income and replacement costs data) which are
more pertinent to a particular case. Despite the usefulness of such
information, it became more difficult to obtain when the 1967 legisla-
ture specifically enjoined local boards from issuing subpoenas to take
depositions, or from considering depositions for any purpose.18 6 It is
unclear whether this prevents the use of other discovery devices, such
as interrogatories.
Can the taxpayer bring an action to perpetuate testimony under
Code of Civil Procedure section 2017 and thus obtain depositions from
or otherwise secure information from the assessor? In Hunt-Wesson
Foods, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus,18 7 the court said the taxpayer could
not. It reasoned that the only possible utility of the perpetuation pro-
ceeding prior to an equalization hearing would be discovery, since
depositions would not be admissible either in the equalization hearing
or in court; the purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 2017, the
opinion continues, is not to facilitate discovery but is to preserve evi-
dence for introduction in a future court case.lS8
The confused situation of the remotely accessible court order to
secure information relating to affairs of another person, and the appar-
ent obstacles to normal discovery in preparation for an equalization
hearing may leave the taxpayer bereft of the evidence he needs to
prepare a proper case. If the court-order provision is to have mean-
ing, the legislature should clarify and further define the circum-
stances under which it is proper and how it is to be secured. The
legislature should also provide for a taxpayer's action against the as-
sessor for refusal to disclose evidence vital to establishment of the value
of the taxpayer's property. The court, in such an action, should be
allowed to determine, under a protective order if necessary, the im-
185. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
186. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1609.
187. 273 A.C.A. 107, 77 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1969).
188. Prior attempts to get the California Supreme Couit to allow discovery bMfore
equalization hearings, also based on the propriety of a peti:ion to perpezuatQ tes imo-y
were refused by the court without comment. Id. at 112-13, 77 Cal. Rptr. at F35 36.
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portance of the information to the protesting taxpayer's case.
H. Clarification of Revenue and Taxation Code Section 402.1
As discussed above, 189 the legislature has provided that land sub-
ject to enforceable restrictions on its use shall be valued in accordance
with the permitted uses, and it is rebuttably presumed that the restric-
tion will stay in effect for the predictable future. The assessor and the
local board of equalization must consider the restrictions in valuing
the property. 190 Revenue and Taxation Code section 402.1 states:
Restrictions shall include but are not necessarily limited to zoning
restrictions limiting the use of land and any recorded contractual
provisions limiting the use of lands entered into with a governmental
agency pursuant to state laws or applicable local ordinances.
This sentence has been construed differently by various county counsel
and taxpayers' representatives. No appellate court has dealt with the
question. Does it apply, for example, to agreements among private
persons such as lease restrictions or deed restrictions?
Some assessors ignore restrictions that are not imposed by a gov-
ernmental entity, or to which a governmental entity is not a party with
the right of enforcement, on the theory that the private parties may
rescind the restrictions at any time. The same argument could of
course be made as to contracts under the Williamson Act 9' or the
Open-Space Easement Law.' 92 Thus, it seems the root question should
be, "Is the market value of the property, in fact, affected?"
Certainly a deed restriction that gives a member of the public the
right to bring an action in case of a violation affects the value of the
property. Similarly, those restrictions in which a large number of other
property owners have an interest worth protecting would affect the
value of the restricted property. The author believes that the legisla-
ture should clarify the matter by specifically including private restric-
tions on use within Revenue and Taxation Code section 402.1. Such
a clarification could assure both the protection and the fairness which
was intended by enactment of the section.
Conclusion
This article's review, though brief, should be a clear indication of
the wide scope of remedies now available to the taxpayer who feels
189. See text accompanying notes 118-23 supra.
190. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1.
191. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51200-95.
192. Id. §§ 51050-65.
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his assessment is unfair. It remains for California lawyers to become
aware of the broad avenues of protest and to lead their clients down
them. Professor Donald G. Hagman has pointed out that "although
the California property tax produces revenues second only to those
produced in'California by the federal income tax, there are only a
handful of lawyers in California who could hold themselves out as
property tax specialists."19  If California lawyers take note, and the
further reforms recommended above are instituted, California could in-
deed be the first state in tax equity as well as in population.
193. Hagman, Book Review, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1613, 1615 (1968).
